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Abstract
This paper analyzes how differences in productivity across banks and the evolution
of industry productivity over time might determine the intermediation costs and the
restructuring process of the banking industry in the Great Recession. With data of
Spanish banks, we find that less productive banks are more likely to exit than more
productive banks, and that surviving banks acquire target banks in order to expand
their branch network in local markets where they are underrepresented. Competition
among banks contributes to the translation of industry productivity growth into lower
interest rates of loans. Nonetheless, we find that the industry profit margin in loans
increases during the period because of the modest industry productivity growth and
the lower intensity of competition from branch closing.
Keywords Banks · Productivity · Restructuring · Interest rates
JEL Classification G21
1 Introduction
The economic slowdown and the fall in the demand for banking products since the
outburst of the crisis, together with the use of new technologies in the access and
production of banking services, have caused a deep restructuring in the banking sector
of many countries. In the process, many banks have disappeared after closing down
or being absorbed by other banks, and the size of the branches network has been
substantially reduced. A key policy issue is to determine whether the restructuring of
the banking industry is positive or not for social welfare and under what conditions.
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This paper analyzes the social benefits of the restructuring of the banking industry
from two sources, the evolution of the total factor productivity in the production of
banking services, and the competitive pressure to pass through productivity growth
to interest rates of loans and deposits. The restructuring of the industry contributes to
social efficiency if more productive banks increase their market share and the gains
in production efficiency (productivity) benefit bank customers, in the form of lower
intermediation costs. For this analysis, we use data from Spanish banks during the
period from 2007 to 2015. The Spanish banking sector has undergone a profound
restructuring process since the beginning of the crisis: savings banks transformed into
shareholder-owned banks, increase in industry concentration and closure of one-third
of the bank branches all over the country.
The specification of the empirical models and the hypotheses to be tested are
inspired on the theoretical predictions derived from a model of spatial competition
à la Salop (1979). For a given number of bank branches in the local market, we solve
for the Nash equilibrium in prices (interest rates) and market shares of banks with dif-
ferent productivity and, thus, different operating costs. The model predicts that more
productive banks charge lower (higher) interest rates for their loans (deposits) than the
less productive ones, and that interest rates of loans (deposits) decrease (increase) with
the average total factor productivity, TFP, of the competing banks. Also, in the short-
term equilibrium, market shares and profits of bank branches increase with their TFP.
During the crisis, demand falls and high-productivity banks were in a better position
to acquire low productivity and reduce capacity through restructuring and branches
closing.
The paper tests three main hypotheses. First, more productive banks charge lower
(higher) interest rates of loans (deposits) and industry productivity gains reduce bank-
ing intermediation costs. Second, more productive banks outlast the less productive
ones after a negative demand shock, since higher productivity implies lower operat-
ing costs and higher profits. And third, acquiring banks choose the acquired partner
searching for complementarity in the spatial distribution of own and acquired net-
work of branches. We also examine whether branch closures reduce the intensity of
competition in local markets through increasing spatial differentiation.
We find that less productive banks exit the industry in the restructuring process,
increasing average and reducing the dispersion of industry productivity. Nonetheless,
the rise in industry productivity due to the exit of less productive banks is (partially)
offset by the slowdown in productivity growth from the fact that the demand for
banking services decreases at a pace faster than the reduction of industry capacity.
The market share of exiting banks is distributed across the surviving banks, which
absorb banks with the presence in markets where they are underrepresented. Taking
the number of banks and branches as given, the interest rates of loans decrease with
industry productivity growth, and more productive banks set lower loan interest rates
than the less productive ones. Finally, we find that equilibrium interest rates of loans
decrease with the size of the local market (higher density of bank branches).
All these predictions are consistent with the theoretical results. However, the empiri-
cal results do not support the model predictions in the deposits market, possibly because
of the low levels of official interest rates (close to zero) and the competitive distortions
due to the zero-lower bound in the deposit interest rate. From the results, we cannot
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be conclusive about the effect of productivity on M&A among banks, because of the
difficulty of separating size and productivity effects in the match between acquired
and acquiring banks. From our theoretical setup, more productive banks have larger
market share in the equilibrium, so it is productivity that determines size and not
the other way around. Indeed, Moral-Benito (2018) demonstrates that this is the case
in Spanish nonfinancial firms. But it cannot be ruled out that size gives banks some
idiosyncratic advantage that is reflected in higher estimated productivity, for reasons
different from higher production efficiency (for example, economies of scope across
the portfolio of services).
This paper is related to Castro and Galán (2019) measurement and analysis of
productivity gains and cost efficiency of Spanish banks in the period 2000–2015
(follow-up of Galán et al. 2015 for Colombian banks). The key difference is that Castro
and Galán (2019) focus on explaining the effect of restructuring in the evolution of
productivity and cost efficiency of banks, while this paper extends the views of pro-
ductivity as a driver of the process of industry restructuring and intermediation costs.
In this respect, the paper is related to the literature that focuses on the exit decisions of
industrial plants in declining industries and that predicts that more cost-efficient firms
outlast the less efficient ones in the process of exit and capacity reduction (Ghemawat
and Nalebuff 1985; Fudenberg and Tirole 1986; Reynolds 1988). The results from
the empirical analysis support this prediction, and they are in line with Caiazza et al.
(2016) in their analysis of cross-border M&A. However, the focus in this paper is on
domestic banks competing in the same market during a period of demand contraction.
Our paper is also related to the literature that focuses on bank competition during the
crisis (Montes 2014; Fernández et al. 2013; Weill 2013), but competition is determined
by the density of bank branches rather than by the concentration of banks. Finally,
the research is related to papers that explain differences in banks’ profits as a function
of differences in productivity (Caiazza et al. 2016; Almanidis 2013; Fiordelisi and
Molyneux 2010; Berger and Mester 2003; Grifell-Tatje and Lovell 1999). These papers
tend to use productivity measures estimated from stochastic frontier models (SFA) or
with the application of data envelopment analysis (DEA), while here, productivity
is a parameter of the production function of banks, estimated with the methodology
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual
framework underlying the empirical analysis, as well as the empirical equation for
testing the posed. Section 3 details the database used in the analysis, main variables
and their descriptive statistics. In Sect. 4, the main results of the empirical models are
analyzed and Sect. 5 presents the main conclusions of the study.
2 Theoretical framework
Retail banking markets have been traditionally local markets where bank branches
compete for customers located at relatively short distance to the branch. The framework
has two parts. First, we solve for the Nash equilibrium in markets where banks compete
in interest rates of loans and deposits, for given number of banks and branches in each
market. Second, we model the adjustment of capacity in the form of mergers and
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acquisition of banks and the closing of branches after the fall in demand, taking into
consideration the effect of price competition in the profits of individual banks.
2.1 Price competition
The basic model of spatial price competition with a given number of bank branches
is presented in “Appendix A,” together with the Nash equilibrium solution. Retail
banking markets are represented by a Salop’s (1979) circle, with banks’ customers
uniformly distributed around the circumference of the circle of length L  1. In the
same circumference, there are bank branches of different productivity-operating costs
symmetrically located, and customers have to pay a cost per unit of distance to access
the branch for loan or deposit services (horizontal product differentiation). Banks can
borrow and lend in an interbank market at a market given interest rate. From the Nash
equilibrium, the empirical model of the determinants of the interest rate of loans and
deposits is formulated as follows:
r Li j t  βL0 + βL1 r I Bt + βL2 AI N Dt + βL3 R Ai jt + βL4 N jt + CV ′βL5 + εLi j t (1A)
r Di j t  βD0 + βD1 r I Bt + βD2 AI N Dt + βD3 R Ai jt + βD4 N jt + CV ′βD5 + εDi jt (1B)
The subscripts i, j and t refer to bank branch, market and year, respectively. The
dependent variables r Li j t , r
D
i j t refer to the interest rates of loans and deposits of bank
branch i in market j at time t. The variable r I Bt is the interbank interest rate. The
variable AI N Dt is the size-weighted banking industry average productivity in year t,
common to all banks, and RAijt is a measure of the relative difference in productivity
between the bank i and its market competitors. N jt is the number of bank branches
that operate in the market j and time t. CV is a vector of control variables.
From the theoretical results in “Appendix A,” equilibrium interest rates will increase
with the interbank market
(
βL1 > 0; βD1 > 0
)
. Increases in average industry produc-
tivity over time will lower interest rates of loans
(
βL2 < 0
)
and increase interest
rates of deposits
(
βD2 > 0
)
. More efficient banks will set lower (higher) interest on
loans (deposits) than less efficient ones (if bank i is more productive than j, then
βL3 < 0; βD3 > 0). Higher density of branches in the market implies less spatial dif-
ferentiation, more structural competition and lower (higher) interest rates of loans
(deposits) (βL4 < 0; βD4 > 0
)
. With free entry and exit, the number of branches is
endogenous and, in the equilibrium, higher density of demand implies higher density
of branches and more structural competition.
2.2 Productivity and restructuration of the banking system
In the crisis, when the expansion of the balance sheet of banks suddenly stops
and growth rates turned negative, the size of the banking industry appeared over
dimensioned. The process to reduce excess of capacity involved the closing of bank
branches, together with mergers and acquisitions among banks. In the Nash equi-
librium (“Appendix A”), more productive banks earn higher profits than the less
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productive ones. When demand falls, less productive banks are the first that show
losses and, thus, they are expected to exit the market first. The second issue is how the
market share of the exit banks will be allocated among the surviving banks.
2.2.1 Exit of banks
The hypothesis from rational-efficient restructuring is that the likelihood that a bank
exits the industry decreases with the relative productivity, i.e., the less productive banks
are more likely to exit than the more productive ones (Ghemawat and Nalebuff 1985;
Fudenberg and Tirole 1986; Reynolds 1988). To test this hypothesis, we formulate the
empirical model:
Pr(yit  1)  f
(
R Ai jt , CVit
) (2)
where the dependent variable yit takes the value of 1 if bank i exits the market at time
t and zero otherwise. The variable RAijt is a measure of the relative productivity of
the entity compared to its competitors. The empirical prediction is that the estimated
coefficient of the relative productivity variable will be negative. CV is a vector of
control variables that, among others, include proxies of bank size and profitability.
The theoretical model predicts that more productive banks are more profitable and
have a larger market share in the equilibrium. Size and profits can influence the exit
decision, independently from the productivity effect. For example, more profits can be
associated with higher cash flows, and large banks might have higher than proportional
restructuring costs. So, for similar levels of production efficiency, more profitable and
larger banks can delay the market exit.
2.2.2 Branch expansion throughmergers and acquisitions
We posit an empirical model to test two complementary hypotheses on the allocation of
the market share of exiting banks. First, efficient restructuring requires not only that less
productive banks exit first, but also that the market share is allocated to the surviving
banks that are more productive. Second, from the logic of the acquiring banks, it can
be expected that they prefer target banks whose branch network is complementary
to their own, that is, branch networks do not overlap. To test these predictions, we
formulate the following probit model:
Pr(yikt  1)  f (R Aikt , T argetikt , CV ) (3)
where yikt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bank i absorbs bank k in period
t, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable needs to be defined for all the possible
binary combinations of banks, including the combinations i-k and k-i, though yikt only
takes the value of 1 if bank i absorbs bank k, but not the other way around. RAijk is
now a measure of the relative productivity of bank i with respect to bank k at time t,
and Targetikt is a measure (to be explained latter) of how attractive is the market share
of target bank for the potentially acquiring bank j. We expect that the likelihood that
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bank j merges with or acquires bank k increases when bank j is more productive than
bank k, and increases with the attractiveness of the target’s market.
Implicit in the formulation of (3) is the hypothesis of symmetry, in the sense that we
are assuming that a large bank has the same probability of acquiring a small bank than
the other way around. But market frictions make this hypothesis unrealistic. To account
for the effect of size, we include a control variable that accounts for differences in size
between acquired and acquiring bank. We also include variables that identify relative
differences in banks’ profitability and risk, since mergers and acquisitions might also
be conditioned by the cash flows and soundness of the bank.
3 Database and variables
The database contains information on banks, commercial and savings banks that oper-
ated in Spain between 2007 and 2015. It contains balance and profit and loss account
data extracted from Bankscope and completed with the annual reports published by the
CECA and the AEB. The data on the number of bank branches have been obtained from
the annual reports of the Banking Guide published by Maestre Edibán. The data of the
macroeconomic variables have been obtained from the National Institute of Statistics
and the Bank of Spain. The identification of M&A, auctioned banks and new entities
has been constructed using the information published by the Bank of Spain about the
restructuring process of the Spanish banking system. Table 1 presents a summary of
data on the restructuring process of the Spanish banking system elaborated from the
information published in the Bank of Spain’s Report on Banking Supervision (Memo-
ria de Supervisión) between 2007 and 2014.1 From this table, we can observe that the
reduction in the number of banking groups is mainly explained by the disappearance
and consolidation of the old savings banks. The number of bank branches in 2014 has
been reduced by one-third from the maximum reached in 2008.
3.1 Interest rates on loans and deposits, and net service fees
Interest rates of loans and deposits have been calculated with data from balance sheets
and profit and loss accounts of each individual bank. The interest rate for loans is
equal to the ratio of the item “Interest Income” (from the profit and loss account) and
the item “Loans to Customers” (from the balance sheet). The interest rate for deposits
has been calculated with the ratio of “Interest Expenses” (profit and loss account) and
“Deposits from Customers” (balance sheet). Figure 1a shows the average of the loan
and deposit interest rates and the 1-year Euribor interest rate. We observe that the
Euribor interest rate has decreased during the sample period from 4.8% in 2008 to
levels close to 0% in 2015. Despite that the period analyzed covers only partially the
period of Quantitative Easing from the ECB (starting from March 2015), the Euribor
has remained below 2% since 2009. Interest rates of loans and deposits have decreased
over time in parallel to the decrease in the Euribor, as expected from the transmission
of the monetary policy.
1 2014 is the last year for which the Bank of Spain’s Supervisory Report publishes these data.
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Fig. 1 Average interest rates and interest margins. a Interest rates. b Margins and spreads of interest rates
In Fig. 1b, we observe that the margin in the deposit market (difference between
Euribor and interest rate of deposits) has remained at negative levels since 2008,
i.e., the contribution of intermediation margin from the deposits market to the total
intermediation margin of banks has been negative in practically all the period of study.
However, on the loans market the average intermediation margin (interest of loans
minus Euribor) shows an increasing trend reaching levels above 4 percentage points
since 2012. This increase could be offsetting the decline in the deposits margin and
explains the relative stability of margin of interests relative to total assets in Fig. 1b.
In the same period, the net fees collected bank banks, relative to total assets, the other
important source of revenues, have also increased over time (Fig. 1b).
3.2 Measurement of the productivity of banks
The measurement of productivity and efficiency in the banking sector is conditioned
on different assumptions about the nature of the banking activity and the methodology
followed to obtained estimates. First, there are two alternative views of the function of
banks that affect the estimation of productivity. Under the intermediation view, banks
act as intermediaries between depositors and borrowers and, thus, deposits are consid-
ered as inputs of the production function, together with labor and capital. Under the
production approach, banks produce services attached to deposits and loans deposits
and, as a result, deposits are treated as an output. Attending to the methodology,
productivity and efficiency of banks can be estimated directly from the production
function or indirectly from the dual cost or profit functions. Finally, productivity and
cost efficiency can be estimated using parametric and nonparametric (mainly DEA)
methods.
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The view adopted in this paper assumes that banks produce services attached to
loans and deposits (production approach). The productivity is derived from the esti-
mation of the production function of banks using parametric methods. The approach,
then, contrasts with that in Castro and Galán (2019) that use the intermediation view,
with deposits as inputs, and productivity and efficiency estimated from the dual cost
function (trans-log specification).
We assume that banks use labor, L, and capital, K , to produce and sell services
delivered through a network of branches. The output of the bank in volume of services,
Y, is assumed proportional to the sum of total loans and total deposits. The quantity of
labor input of the bank is estimated by the labor costs, and the measure of the capital
stock input is the volume of fixed material assets reported in the balance sheet. From
the production function Yit  Ait F(Lit , Kit ), the TFP of the bank is Ait  YitF(Lit ,Kit ) .
The estimation of Ait  PRODUCTIVITYit for bank i in year t is estimated as in
Martín-Oliver et al. (2013) using the proposed methodology in Olley and Pakes (1996)
and developed in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), but with a different time period and
definition of inputs. This methodology is based on the estimation of the parameters of
the production function of banks, correcting for an endogenous bias in the estimation
of the elasticity of output with respect to labor and capital due to the existence of
productivity shocks that also affect the demand for labor. To correct the bias caused
by productivity shocks, it is necessary to define an intermediate input τ that in our
case will be the total volume of debt.2 The results of the estimation of the production
function show that the elasticity of the output with respect to the labor factor is 0.578,
and with respect to the capital factor of 0.357, both coefficients were statistically
significant at 1%. The null hypothesis of the existence of constant returns to scale
cannot be rejected (p value of 0.47).3
3.2.1 Productivity of banks and industry average
With the estimated values of the parameters of the production function, the TFP of
bank i in year t, the (Solow) residual, is calculated, in log terms, as follows
ln P RO DUCT I V I T Yit  ln Ait  ln(Dit + Lit ) − 0.578 ln Nit − 0.357 ln Kit .
(4)
The industry productivity, PRODUCTIV.INDUSTRYt , in year t is the average of
the productivity of all banks in the time period.
From Fig. 2a, the size effect on differences in productivity among banks explains
about 10% of the productivity of the industry. That is, the largest banks are the most
2 This intermediate input fulfills the necessary assumption that the entity could increase the amount of debt
to meet possible productivity shocks, for any level of capital.
3 Following Martín-Oliver et al. (2013), we have tried to obtain a net measure of productivity, regressing the
gross productivity on variables capturing differences in business models available in Bankscope (weight
of loans, weight of interbank, weight of total securities, regulatory capital and total assets) and on time
dummies. Given that the coefficients of the variables were not statistically significant during this sample
period, we assume that the residuals of this regression (measure of net productivity) were not different to
our direct measure of productivity obtained from Eq. (4).
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Fig. 2 Productivity of the banking sector. a Productivity of the industry. b Productivity growth. c Average
productivity, by size. d Distribution of productivity (base 100  2005)
productive and, therefore, the simple average of productivity is lower than the weighted
average that reflects the productivity of the industry. Since the hypothesis of constant
returns to scale in production cannot be rejected, the size effect in the productivity of
banks cannot be attributed to increasing returns to scale. As the years progressed, the
importance of differences in size decreases and by the end of 2015 reduces to 2.83%
of the industry productivity.
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Figure 2b shows the annual and cumulative growth rates of industry productivity.
Comparing the levels of 2015 and 2007, we observe that productivity has a cumulative
growth of 2% during the whole sample period, with an average annual growth rate
around 0.37%. Overall, we observe that during the sample period, the productivity of
the industry has remained relatively stable. In 2010, there was a rebound in industry
productivity, which could be explained by the exit of banks with low productivity
(from Table 1, there are 12 mergers in 2010 with 23 banks involved). During the
two following years, the industry productivity falls again, coinciding with the years
of more severe restructuring. Probably, the fall of demand for banking services was
higher than the reduction in capacity in response to the contraction in demand. In the
years 2013–2014, productivity grew marginally and in 2015, coinciding with the start
of the Quantitative Easing, the industry productivity experienced a 5% annual growth.
Figure 2c shows the time evolution of average TFP for small, medium and large
banks.4 The figure confirms that the average productivity increases with the size of
the bank, though the importance of the size effect decreases over time. There are two
reasons: first, because the less productive small banks operating during the first years of
the sample disappear after 2011 (merged or absorbed by others) and, second, because
the differences in TFP between medium and large banks decrease over time. Therefore,
the preliminary evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that most productive banks
survive and that M&A generates larger and more productive institutions, reducing the
heterogeneity across surviving banks.5
3.2.2 Banks of low and of high productivity
One of the variables of the empirical model is the productivity of a bank relative to the
productivity of its competitors, RAikt . We consider that the competitors of bank i are
those banks with branches in the relevant market of bank i. The relevant market of bank
i includes all provinces where the bank has at least five branches.6 In the estimation
of the model, banks will be classified as banks with higher and banks with lower
productivity than the reference bank as follows. The variable I d(L OW P RO Dit )
will take value 1 if bank i in year t has a productivity lower than the 25th percentile of
the productivity distribution of banks that compete in the relevant market of bank i in
year t. Similarly, the variable I d(H I G H P RO Dit ) will take value 1 if bank i in year
t has a productivity higher than the 75th percentile of the productivity distribution of
the banks that compete in the relevant market of bank i in year t.
4 Classification of banks made using the whole sample data; each size class includes one-third of the
observations.
5 The time evolution of the TFP index in Fig. 3 is not too different from the time pattern of the TFP index
reported in Fig. 1 in Castro and Galán (2019), obtained with a different methodologies and with size classes
of banks defined as small (25%), medium (50%) and large (25%). There are, however, some differences in
cross-sectional comparisons. Castro and Galan find that small banks are more productive than medium-size
banks and that the differences in average productivity between medium and large banks do not converge as
much as they do in our analysis. Finally, they find evidence of scale economies in production for Spanish
banks that explains part of their TFP differences across sizes of banks.
6 The definition of this threshold aims at identifying all the provinces where banks have a minimum level
of retail activity, but excluding cases of bank branches whose existence is justified only for institutional
reasons (for instance, almost all banks have one branch in Madrid).
123
SERIEs
Figure 2d shows the distribution of the productivity of the banks during the sample
period, as well as the distribution of the productivity of the banks that have a high
(higher than the 75th percentile) and low (lower than the 25th percentile) productivity.
We observe that productivity presents greater dispersion and wider tail in the left part of
the distribution, while the productivity distribution of banks with higher productivity
is more concentrated.
In the model of branch expansion through mergers and acquisitions, the explana-
tory variable is a measure of the direct comparison of productivity of acquiring and
acquired bank. Then, we define the variable Id(PRODit> PRODkt), a binary variable
that identifies the cases in which the productivity of the acquiring entity is higher than
the productivity of the acquired entity.
3.3 Market sizes, target banks and target markets
In the short term, the number of bank branches in the market is taken as exogenous.
Local markets with higher demand for bank services will be markets with higher
density of branches (higher N in Eqs. 1A and 1B). In the empirical analysis we take the
number of branches in the market as proxy for the size of the local market (provinces).
Then, we define the variable MARKET SIZEit of i in year t as the average of the number
of branches in provinces that are part of the relevant market of bank i.
TARGETikt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bank k has branches in
at least one market considered “target” of entity i. We define a province as a “target”
market for bank i if the market share of i in that province is lower than the average
market share of bank i in the rest of markets where it is present. In order to account for
the relative importance of the number of branches held by bank k in i’s target markets,
we also define the variable SUM SHARESikt as the sum of the market shares of the
bank k in markets that are considered as target markets for the bank i. We expect that
the attractiveness of a target bank increases with SUM SHARESikt .
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the previous variables. We observe that the
size of the market, MARKET SIZEit , decreases over time due to the fall of the number of
branches during the crisis and restructuring. TARGETikt decreases over time, possibly
because the number of banks decreases, and the surviving banks are increasing the
market shares in their target markets over time through the acquisition of other banks.
The sum of the market shares of target banks, SUM SHARESikt , remains relatively
stable over time.
Historically, the Spanish banking industry has been split between not-for-profit
savings banks (the so-called cajas) and shareholder banks. The restructuring of the
banking industry in the sample period has affected specially to the savings banks,
since many of them have been merged or acquired and/or converted into shareholder
banks (except two very small ones). The unique ownership and governance of cajas
conditioned the process of merger and acquisitions. In the empirical analysis, we
control for the differences in ownership and governance between savings banks and
commercial banks with the variables Id(SAVINGSBANK) that takes the value of 1 if
the bank is caja.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics; Spanish banks, 2007–2015
Nr ln(MARKET
SIZE)
TARGET SUM SHARES ln ASSETS MARGIN (×100)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2007 63 7.22 0.73 0.74 0.39 0.44 0.42 16.64 1.39 0.09 1.51
2008 63 7.23 0.75 0.74 0.40 0.44 0.42 16.68 1.52 − 0.45 1.38
2009 64 7.22 0.72 0.73 0.40 0.44 0.42 16.71 1.48 − 1.78 1.15
2010 54 7.16 0.71 0.68 0.40 0.47 0.43 16.93 1.47 − 0.95 1.14
2011 30 7.06 0.71 0.68 0.40 0.47 0.43 17.78 1.18 − 1.40 1.24
2012 25 7.01 0.68 0.65 0.39 0.48 0.43 18.00 1.15 − 2.28 1.38
2013 23 7.00 0.66 0.65 0.39 0.48 0.43 17.99 1.14 − 2.15 1.34
2014 21 6.93 0.68 0.63 0.39 0.48 0.44 18.04 1.18 − 1.76 1.42
2015 21 6.88 0.68 0.63 0.39 0.48 0.44 18.07 1.24 − 1.39 0.57
Nr Z-SCORE(%) LLP/LOANS(%) ROA(%) CAPITAL RATIO
(%)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
2007 63 62.0 41.8 28.3 34.1 0.95 0.56 6.18 3.62
2008 63 49.4 37.0 41.6 40.9 0.68 0.80 6.13 4.05
2009 64 33.9 29.6 48.0 43.7 0.42 0.89 6.31 4.16
2010 54 34.7 31.5 35.5 41.5 0.26 1.20 5.80 4.85
2011 30 37.3 27.9 43.4 43.0 -0.08 1.37 6.61 4.17
2012 25 16.1 21.1 56.6 45.4 -2.96 3.26 5.41 4.74
2013 23 21.5 27.0 55.1 43.9 -0.09 0.83 6.27 4.28
2014 21 18.8 21.1 53.4 43.2 0.44 0.56 7.30 4.32
2015 21 43.4 30.1 49.9 40.1 0.48 0.61 7.76 4.22
3.4 Other explanatory variables
The rest of the variables included in the models capture the heterogeneity among banks
in size, return on investment, leverage and risk. Size of banks is measured by total assets
in logs, ln(TOTALASSETSit). ROAit is equal to the ratio of earnings after taxes over total
assets at the end of year t. CAPITAL RATIOit is the ratio between capital and reserves
over total assets (leverage). The risk variables include: PROVISIONS/LOANSit , equal
to the ratio of the loan loss provisions of the bank with respect to the total loan portfolio,
and Zit , the Z-score of the bank, equal to the ratio between ROA + CAPITAL RATIO
and the standard deviation of ROA (Goetz et al. 2016; Laeven and Levine 2009).
“Appendix B” shows the list of all variables of the model and the respective definition.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables that capture the heterogeneity
of the banking entities. The average size of banks in assets increases over time, while
dispersion decreases, which is consistent with the process of concentration of the
sector in a small number of large banks. The net interest income of the median bank is
decreasing, consistent with Fig. 1. Z-score is a measure inversely related to the level of
risk, so we find an increase in the level of risk assumed by the banks during the period
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of crisis that softens in the last year 2015. Similar evidence is found from the evidence
from the evolution of the proxy of risk of the loan portfolio, PROVISION/LOANSit .
The average ROAit of the banks has experienced a decline to negative levels during the
most severe years of the crisis (where the greatest dispersion is recorded), although it
has returned to the positive since 2015. The CAPITAL RATIOit has followed the same
evolution, reaching its minimum during the worst years of the crisis, and increasing
to 7.75% in 2015, possibly due to the efforts of the banks to improve their levels and
quality of capital to comply with Basel III. All the variables used in the empirical
analysis are defined in a more detailed way in “Appendix B.”
4 Results of the estimation of the empirical models
4.1 Interest rates
The results of the estimation of the model of the determinants of interest rates, Eqs. (1A)
and (1B), are presented in columns I to IV of Table 3. For each interest rate, loans and
deposits we present the results of two estimations, the OLS and the bank fixed effects
estimation. In all cases the standard errors of the estimated coefficients are robust
to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the bank level. Overall, the empirical results
are consistent with the theoretical predictions in the case of interest of loans, but not
consistent in the case of deposits, where the only estimated significant coefficients are
those of the macroeconomic variables.
From estimation I, the coefficient of Id(LOWPROD) is positive and statistically
significant at 1%, meaning that differences in productivity among banks translate into
differences in loan interest rates, as predicted. On average, the interest rate on loans
is 30 basis points higher in banks with low productivity, Id(LOWPROD), than in the
rest of banks. However, the coefficients of Id(HIGHPROD) and Id(LOWPROD) in
the case of interests of deposits are both nonstatistically significant, meaning that the
predictions from the theory model are not visible in the deposits market.
Also from estimation I, the estimated coefficient of the industry productivity
variable is negative and statistically significant. Increases (decreases) in industry pro-
ductivity result in decreases (increases) in interest rates of loans, again consistent with
the prediction from the Nash equilibrium solution. Since the cumulative growth of
industry productivity during the period 2007–2015 is around 2%, this growth implies
a decrease in the interest rates of loans of 4.4 basis points. In the year of 2015 with a
5% of industry productivity growth the contribution to the reduction in interest rates
of loan would be of around 11 basis points.
We also observe that the estimated coefficient of the variable ln(MARKET SIZEit)
is negative and significant at 1%. Therefore, higher density of bank branches in the
local market implies lower interest rates of loans in the market equilibrium. This is
the structural competition effect on market prices, with less spatial differentiation
and more competition among bank branches in larger markets. The closing of bank
branches during the sample period lowers the average value of the proxy variable
for MARKET SIZE over time (Table 2). With lower density of bank branches, spatial
differentiation increases and equilibrium interest rates of loans will increase (negative
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estimated coefficient). This can be one of the reasons why the profit margin of bank
loans increases in the sample period (Fig. 1).
Finally, the interest rate of loans increases with the EURIBOR interest rate (inter-
bank interest rate), again consistent with the prediction from the theoretical model.
However, the estimated coefficient is less than the value of 1, suggesting some delays
in the transmission of monetary policy.
As for the control variables of other characteristics, the negative sign of the estimated
coefficient of Zit indicates that banks with a higher risk profile (low values of Z) charge
higher loan interest rate. The positive sign of the variable PROVISIONS/LOANSit goes
in the same direction, although the estimated coefficient is not significant. The size of
the bank does not significantly affect the interest rates of loans.
The negative estimated coefficient of the variable GDP GROWTHt indicates that
interest rates of loans are lower in years of economic expansion and higher in years
of economic contraction (counter cyclical). INFLATIONt , does not have an effect in
the interest rate of loans, additional to the effect through the sensitivity of the Euribor
interest rate to the inflation of the economy.
The results of model (1B) on the interest rates of deposits are shown in estimation
III of Table 3. Overall, the results differ from the theoretical predictions, particularly
with respect to the productivity variables. Nonetheless, they are consistent with the
predictions on effects of the macroeconomic variables. EURIBOR and INFLATION
variables have a positive effect, whereas deposit interest rates are negatively related
to GDP GROWTH (countercyclical interest of deposits). The positive and significant
coefficient of lnASSETS indicates that larger banks pay higher interest rates on the
deposits, maybe because of competition effects.
The results from the fixed effects estimation of models (1A) and (1B) appear in
estimations II and IV in Table 3. Now the estimated coefficients of the bank-level
variables, including the relative differences in productivity, lose statistical significance,
probably because there is relatively low time variability and the coefficients in the
OLS estimation captured persistence across-bank variability, now captured by the
fixed effects. However, the estimated coefficients of the time-varying variables, such
as industry productivity, maintain the sign and increase their statistical significance.
4.2 Fees as substitute of deposits margin
Interest rates of banks deposits have, in practice, a lower bound of zero. The possi-
bility of negative interest rates would likely lead many people to hold cash instead
of deposits. This lower bound could explain why some of the predictions from the
spatial competition model are not supported by the data in the case of deposits. Under
the impossibility to charge negative interest rates on deposits, the response of banks
could be to increase the fees they charge for services they provide to the customers.
The increasing ratio of net fees over total assets in Fig. 1b would suggest that banks
responded to the decline in the deposits margin with higher services fees. We now
present evidence that supports this conjecture.
Estimations V and VI in Table 3 show the results of estimating the fees per euro of
total assets of banks, as a function of the relative efficiency of banks, macroeconomic
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variables and the deposits margin, defined as the difference between the Euribor and
interest rate of deposits of the bank in the corresponding year. The estimated coefficient
of MARGINit is negative and statistically significant in the OLS estimation and not
significant in the fixed effects estimation. These results are in line with conjecture that
banks with lower deposits margins apply higher fees for their services; in a context of
high competitive pressure to maintain high levels of deposit interest rates the levels
of the official interest rates are low. As for the rest of explanatory variables, the only
coefficient that is statistically significant is Id(HIGHPROD) with a negative sign,
implying that more productive banks charge lower prices for their services than less
productivity ones.
4.3 Probability of exiting the bankingmarket
Table 4 presents the results of the empirical model that test whether low-productivity
banks are more likely to exit the market than high-productivity banks. Estimation I
presents the results only including the relative variables of productivity as explanatory
of the decision. We observe that the coefficient of Id(LOWPROD) is positive and
statistically significant, confirming the prediction that low-productivity banks have a
higher probability of not surviving than the rest of the banks. Estimation II presents
the results of the model including control variables to account for other factors that
might influence the probability of exit, such as risk or profitability of the banks. We
observe that the coefficient of Id(LOWPROD) remains statistically significant (though
at 10%) and with similar value. As for the rest of variables, we observe that cajas are
more likely to exit than banks, even after controlling for variables of profits and risk.
We also find that banks with low profitability and higher risk (lower Z) are more likely
to exit. As for the size of the bank, larger banks are more likely to outlast competitors,
since the coefficient of ln(TOTALASSETS) is negative and statistically significant at
5%. All of them are results consistent with the theoretical predictions and in alignment
with the profile of the entities that experienced more problems during the crisis.
From the results in column II, we observe that the size of the bank conditions the
probability of exit, controlling for differences in productivity. This suggests that, above
a certain bank size, the resistance to exit dominates over any effect of differences in
productivity. For robustness analysis, Table 4 also shows the results of model estimated
for subsamples of small, medium and large banks. The results shown in columns III,
IV and V indicate that the effect of productivity on the probability of exit remains
statistically significant for the small- and medium-size banks, but not for large banks.
These results suggest that size might be an obstacle to restructuring because, for large
banks, differences in productivity do not affect the probability of exit.
4.4 Branch expansion throughmergers and takeovers
Table 5 shows the results of estimating Eq. (3) with a logit model to analyze whether
the most productive banks and those that have better withstood the crisis have taken
advantage of the situation to expand their market share in “target” provinces through
the acquisition of less productive banks.
123
SERIEs
Table 4 Probability of exit of an entity
Dependent variable: Pr(Bank i exiting market at t)
[I] [II] [III] [IV] [V]
Id(HIGH PRODit ) 0.242 0.251 − 2.300** 1.024 1.979
(0.468) (0.455) (1.155) (1.022) (1.632)
Id(LOW PRODit ) 1.005** 0.703* − 0.963 1.719** 1.884
(0.450) (0.405) (1.007) (0.777) (2.142)
Id(SAVINGS BANKit ) 1.413** 3.017* 1.890* − 0.844
(0.563) (1.720) (1.029) (1.006)
ROAit − 47.689* − 97.832*** − 41.604* 26.941
(25.242) (27.535) (23.357) (78.910)
CAPITAL RATIOit − 9.059 33.622 6.113 − 99.329***
(7.129) (24.881) (6.939) (37.507)
PROVISIONS/LOANSit − 0.623 − 4.424** − 0.329 − 0.375
(0.438) (2.160) (0.373) (0.660)
Zit − 0.019*** − 0.077*** − 0.049** − 0.019
(0.005) (0.023) (0.021) (0.014)
ln(TOTAL ASSETSit ) − 0.702*** 0.126 0.326 − 1.811
(0.185) (0.357) (1.527) (1.220)
Pseudo-R2 0.383 0.545 0.683 0.578 0.460
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TIME DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 490 490 165 162 163
Standard errors in parentheses. The results are from logit using data of Spanish banks between 2007 and
2015. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank exits market and
zero otherwise. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the bank level
p < 0.01  ∗∗∗; p < 0.05  ∗∗; p < 0.1  ∗
From Column I, we observe that the coefficient of the variable TARGETikt is positive
and statistically significant at 1%. This implies that the probability of a bank acquiring
another bank increases if the acquired entity has branches operating in at least one
of the markets where entity i wants to grow (lower presence in the market before
the acquisition). This result is reinforced by the positive and statistically significant
coefficient of the variable SUM SHARESikt , which suggests that the higher the market
share of the potential acquired entity in the target market, the greater the likelihood that
the entity i absorbed it. However, the coefficient of SUM SHARESikt is not statistically
significant when we include the size comparison as explanatory variable. Probably,
only larger banks can afford buying large networks of branches, so the size effect
neutralizes the value effect.
From Column II, the positive sign of Id(PRODit> PRODkt) indicates that this strat-
egy is more likely if the acquired banks have a productivity lower than the productivity
of the acquiring banks, that is, more efficient banks are absorbing less efficient banks.
However, the estimated magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated coef-
ficient decrease when we include the differences in size in the regression. It appears
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Table 5 Probability of absorbing another bank
Dependent variable: Pr(Bank i absorbing bank k at t)
[I] [II] [III] [IV] [V]
TARGETikt 2.871*** 2.480*** 2.179*** 2.117*** 2.082***
(0.514) (0.516) (0.516) (0.518) (0.515)
SUMSHARESikt 0.313** 0.333** 0.053 0.026 0.050
(0.156) (0.165) (0.174) (0.181) (0.184)
Id(PRODit > PRODkt ) 1.941*** 0.293* 0.082 0.078
(0.140) (0.164) (0.154) (0.155)
Id(SIZEit > SIZEkt ) 3.320*** 2.518*** 2.414***
(0.182) (0.235) (0.239)
Id(ROAit > ROAkt ) 0.875*** 0.858***
(0.199) (0.195)
Id(CAPITALit > CAPITALkt ) 0.659*** 0.649***
(0.176) (0.174)
Id(Zit > Zkt ) − 0.091 − 0.133
(0.157) (0.158)
Id(LLPit > LLPkt ) − 0.012 − 0.071
(0.185) (0.185)
Id(SAVINGSBANKit ) − 0.071
(0.185)
Pseudo-R2 0.098 0.104 0.208 0.228 0.229
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TIME DUMMIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 95,024 95,024 95,024 95,024 95,024
p < 0.01  ∗∗∗; p < 0.05  ∗∗; p < 0.1  ∗
Standard errors in parentheses. The results are from logit using data of Spanish banks between 2007 and
2015. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank i acquires bank k
and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the bank level
that the size effect dominates, though not neutralizes, the productivity effect in the
matching of merging or acquiring banks. Size and productivity are positively corre-
lated in our sample data, and our model predicts that productivity determines size and
not the other way around. But to demonstrate that the size effect hides productivity
effects is out of the scope of this paper. Realistically, the asymmetry in the probability
that smaller banks acquire large banks also determines why productivity differences
become nonstatistically significant when controlling for the size variable.
The inclusion of profitability and risk in Column IV indicates that acquiring banks
are more capitalized and more profitable than the acquired ones. At the same time, the
coefficient of productivity differences becomes nonstatistically significant. Again, the
model predicts that productivity drives profitability and not the other way around. But
the combination of productivity and cash flows in the ROA plus the higher capitaliza-
tion required to absorb a bank might explain why profitability and solvency dominate
over productivity in the matching of acquiring and acquired banks.
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Column V shows the results of the estimation including Id(SAVINGSBANK) among
the explanatory variables. The estimated coefficient is positive and significant, indi-
cating that savings banks are more likely to be targets of acquisitions than commercial
banks.
5 Conclusions
This paper presets estimates of the evolution of total factor productivity of Spanish
banks in the period 2007–2015 and examines how the differences in productivity
across banks and the evolution of industry productivity over time impact on the costs
of banks. We find that the industry productivity at the end of the sample period is
practically the same than that at the beginning of the period. Up to 2010, productivity
grows at 2.7% annually, but it decreases at annual growth rates of 5.49% and 6.34% in
2011 and 2012, respectively. Probably, the negative growth rates of productivity after
2010 can be explained by a reduction in the production capacity at a slower pace than
the reduction of the demand for bank products.
We also find evidence supporting our theoretical prediction that more productive
banks charge lower loan interest rates than less productive ones, and that loan interest
rates are negatively correlated with the evolution of the industry productivity over time.
According to the empirical results, less productive banks charge interest rates of loans
30 basis points higher than the rest of banks. Also, a growth rate in industry productivity
of 1% implies an average reduction of interest rates of loans of 2.2 basis points. The
predictions from the model on the effect of productivity in the interest rates of deposits
are not supported by the empirical results. One plausible explanation is that banks have
negative profit margins in the deposits market, since they cannot set negative interest
rates on deposits in a period of zero official interest rates. However, there is evidence
that banks might have compensated the negative margin in the deposits market with
higher fees charged on services to consumers (payments).
We also find evidence that productivity differences across banks condition the
industry restructuring process, in terms of which banks exit the industry (merged
or absorbed) and in terms of the matching between acquiring and acquired banks. In
particular, effects seem to dominate the restructuring process, since less productive
banks are more likely to exit the industry than more productive banks, and acquiring
banks are more productive than the acquired ones. The restructuring of capacity also
responds to strategic interests of individual banks, in the sense that acquiring banks
prefer targets with branches located in markets where they are underrepresented.
It must be said, however, that the productivity effect in the probability of exit is
statistically significant only for the groups of small- and medium-size banks. We
also find that differences in size, profitability and solvency between acquiring and
acquired banks dominate the effect of differences in productivity to explain the match-
ing between acquiring and target banks. Acquiring banks are larger, more profitable
and better capitalized than the acquired banks. Theoretically, productivity differences
drive size and profit differences among banks, but this paper has not empirically
demonstrated that this is the case in our sample data. It is more accurate to say that the
restructuring has increased the concentration of the Spanish banking sector in more
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profitable and better capitalized banks. We leave for future research a more thorough
analysis of the causality of differences in productivity into differences in profitability
and solvency of banks.
The evidence supporting that efficiency has driven the restructuring of the Spanish
banking industry is encouraging from the public policy point of view. However, it
remains to be studied whether, along a more extended period of time, the increase
in the concentration of the banking sector can make loans and deposits markets less
competitive, that is, productivity growth might not be sufficient to reduce the industry
intermediation costs over time. So far, the results of the paper provide supporting evi-
dence that the reduction in the density of bank branches following the fall of demand,
could have had contributed to maintain or to increase the margin in the interest rates of
loans during the sample period, since lower density of branches implies lower spatial
differentiation and less competition.
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Appendix A: Production, demand and interest rates competition
In this Appendix we present the conceptual framework that supports the empirical
analysis on the determinants of interest rates of loans and deposits by banks. This
includes a description of the production function that is estimated for the calculation
of the productivity of banks and industry average, a description of the demand functions
and the Nash equilibrium solution from price competition.
Production and cost function
The production unit of banking services, giving loans and collecting deposits, is the
branch. The production function for the representative bank branch i is given by:
Li + Di  [min(qi , Fi , (Ei , I Ki ; Ai ))] (A1)
The output of the bank branch is equal to the sum of loans (L) and deposits (D).
Each branch has a fixed capacity q determined by the physical space and a variable
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capacity that depends on the quantities of variable inputs, the number of employees
per branch (E) and the IT capital per branch (IK).7 Parameter A represents the level
of productivity of the branch. Previous research with a similar data set (Martín-Oliver
et al. 2014) has found that output per bank branch does not vary with the physical
capital of the bank, confirming that physical capital is a quasi-fixed input tied to the
capacity of the branch; the function F() is linear homogeneous (i.e., it exhibits constant
returns to scale) in labor and IT capital inputs, and there are constant returns to scale at
the bank level. These results justify the output of the bank being written as the product
of the output per branch times the number of bank branches, and also that the cost of
physical capital per branch is fixed.
Let w and ccIT be the labor cost and the user cost of IT capital services, respectively.
Since (A1) is linear homogeneous in labor and IT capital, the minimum total variable
cost of producing output (L+ D) in branch i is given by:
Ci (Li + Di ; w, ccI T ; Ai )  (Li + Di )vi (w, ccI T )Ai (A2)
The per-unit variable production cost of bank branch i, ci  vi (w,ccI T )Ai , increases with
the input prices and decreases with the level of operating efficiency, Ai.
The current market price per unit of capacity of the branch is pK , so the investment
in capacity per branch is pkqi Ki. If ccK is the user cost of physical capital (interest
rate plus depreciation), then the fixed cost period of the branch capacity is ccK Ki.
Demand functions
Bank branches are located around a circle as in Salop (1979) spatial competition model.
Bank customers are uniformly located in each point of the circumference of length 1.
The N bank branches in the market are symmetrically located, so the distance between
branches is 1/N . Markets of deposits, subindex D, and loans, subindex L, are taken to be
independent (i.e., no bundling decisions). Let riL, riD be the interest rates of loans and
deposits of bank i, and rL. rD be those of the representative competing bank. Except
for distance to the branch, the buyers perceive banks products as perfect substitutes.
Thus, they will choose one branch or another depending only on differences in the
costs measured by the sum of interest rates and transportation costs. If τ is the cost
per unit of distance, there is a distance xi to branch i at which the buyer located in this
point is indifferent about branch i or the closer competing one:
ri L + τ xi  rL + τ (1/N − xi ) (A3)
From (A3) and taking into account that there are customers at both sides of the branch,
the demand for loans per branch for bank branch i and for that of the representative
competitor are:
Li L (ri L , rL )  2xi  rL + ri L + τ/N
τ
, (A4)
7 On the upward bias in bank-level productivity estimates when IT expenditures are ignored see Koetter
and Noth (2013).
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L L (rL , ri L )  2(1/N − xi )  ri L + rL + τ/N
τ
. (A5)
Respectively, for deposits,
Di D(ri D, rD)  ri D − rD + τ/N
τ
(A6)
DD(rD, roD)  rD − ri D + τ/N
τ
(A7)
Banks face the constraint that demand for funds must be equal to supply of funds.
To balance the constraint, in addition to loans and deposits banks also finance their
activity with a stock of capital K and have access to financial markets where they can
borrow and lend amounts M of funds at the market interest rate r:
L  K  D + M (A8)
Equilibrium interest rates, market shares for loans and deposits and profits
Taking into account (A8) and after arranging the terms, the respective profit functions
per branch of bank i and of the competing representative bank can be written as:
Πi  (ril − r − ci L )Li L (ri L , rL ) + (r − ri D − ci D)Di D(ri D, rD) − ccK i Ki (A9)
Π  (rL − r − cL )L L (rL , ri L ) + (r − rD − cD)DD(rD, ri D) − ccK K (A10)
where L() and D() functions are given by Eqs. (A4) to (A7).
Each bank chooses the interest rates of loans and deposits that maximize profits.
The Nash equilibrium solutions for bank i, interest rate and demand are:
r∗i L  r +
2
3
ci L +
1
3
cL + τ/N
L∗i L 
1
N
− 1
3τ
(ci L − cL) (A11)
r∗i D  r −
2
3
ci D − 13cD − τ/N
D∗i D 
1
N
− 1
3τ
(ci D − cD) (A12)
According to Eqs. (A11) and (A12), equilibrium interest rates of loans and deposits
increase with the market interest rate r. Interest rates of loans (deposits) will be lower
(higher) in markets with higher density of branches (N) and in markets with lower
(higher) perceived differentiation (τ ). Within a given geographical market, the interest
rate of loans (deposits) charged by a given bank will increase (decrease) with the
weighted average of the per-unit operating costs of the bank (ci) and the per-unit
operating cost of its competitors (c) (weights of 2/3 and 1/3, respectively).
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The weighted sum of operating costs, 23 ci +
1
3 c (indistinctly for loans and deposits),
can be written as 23 ci +
1
3 c  16 (ci − c)+ c¯, where c¯  ci +c2 is interpreted as the market
average cost. Therefore, the interest rate of loans of bank i in the Nash equilibrium
can be written as a function of the difference between the own operating cost and
the cost of competitors and of the market average cost. In the empirical analysis of
the determinants of interest rates we substitute unobserved unit operating costs by
measures of productivity of banks. This substitution is justified because the per-unit
operating costs are inversely related to the total factor productivity parameter A. The
total effect of productivity on the interest rates is separated into the effect from market
average productivity, AMit (average A j for all banks j in the same market than bank
i), and the effect from the productivity of bank i relative to that of its competitors in
the same market (R Ai jt ). Since operating costs are inversely rated to productivity,
increasing average market productivity would result in lower (higher) interest rates of
loans (deposits), and interest rates of loans (deposits) of more productive banks are
expected to be lower (higher) than interest rates of the less productive ones.
Higher density of bank branches in the market reduces the volume of loans and
deposits per branch in the market. In equilibrium, bank branches with higher produc-
tivity (lower operating unit costs) have a higher market share in loans and deposits than
banks with lower productivity (from the inverse relationship between unit operating
costs and productivity). Substituting the equilibrium values of prices and quantities
from (A11) and (A12) in (A9), the maximized volume of profit for branch bank branch
i is equal to:
Π∗i 
(
τ/N − 13 (ci L − cL )
)
τ
+
(
τ/N − 13 (ci D − cD)
)
τ
− ccK i Ki (A13)
Profits per branch are the sum of profits in the loans and in the deposits markets.
More efficient banks earn higher profits per branch than less efficient ones (if Ai> A,
then ci< c and Π*i >Π*). The higher profits come from two sources, higher profit
margin and larger market share. Profit per branch is higher if the bank operates in
markets with higher buyers’ perceived differentiation, higher τ , and/or in markets
with lower density of branches, lower N .
Appendix B: Definition of variables
Variables Definition
Dependent variables
Loan interest rateit Interest rate for loans of bank i at year t, calculated as the ratio of
the item “Interests’ Income” and the item “ Loans to Customers”
obtained from balance sheet items and profit and loss accounts
published by each entity
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Variables Definition
Deposit interest rateit Interest rate for deposits of entity i at year t, calculated as the ratio
of “Interests Expenses” and “Deposits from Customers” obtained
from balance sheet items and profit and loss accounts published
by each entity. With this variable, we also construct
MARGIN_DEPit , which is the difference between the 12-month
Euribor interest rate and the average rate of deposits offered by
the entity i at year t
Net Feesit Net commissions of entity i at year t, calculated as the ratio of “net
fees and commissions” and “total assets” obtained from balance
sheet items and profit and loss accounts published by each entity
Pr(Entity i exits in t) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if entity i leaves the
market in t (i.e., entity i is not present in the sample from t + 1
onwards) and zero otherwise
Pr(Entity i absorbing entity k at t) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if entity i absorbs
entity k at time t, and zero otherwise
Independent variables
Productivity
Id(HIGH PROD)it Dummy variable that takes the value of one if bank i in year t has a
productivity higher than the 75th percentile of the productivity
distribution of the banks that compete in the relevant market of
bank i in year t, where the relevant market is defined as all those
provinces where bank i has at least five branches
Id(LOW PROD)it Dummy variable that takes the value of one if bank i in year t has a
productivity lower than the 25th percentile of the productivity
distribution of banks that compete in the relevant market of bank
i in year t, where the relevant market is defined as all those
provinces where bank i has at least five branches
ln(PRODUCTIVITY)it Logarithm of absolute value of the productivity estimate for bank i
in year t, which is recovered from the estimation of banking
production function (5) following Martín-Oliver et al. (2013)
ln(PRODUCTIV. INDUSTRY)t Logarithm of absolute value of productivity of the industry in year
t, calculated as the average of estimated productivity for all
banks as explained above
Id(PRODit>PRODkt) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the productivity of
the acquiring entity i in year t is higher than the productivity of
the acquired entity k in year t, and zero otherwise
Market size and target markets
ln(MARKET SIZE)it Size of the markets in which entity i operates in year t,
approximated by the average number of branches operating in
the provinces in which the bank i has at least 5 branches, in logs
TARGETikt Identifies bank k as a potential target of bank i. It is a dummy that
takes value of one if bank k has branches in year t in at least one
market considered “target” of bank i. A market is considered a
“target” for bank i if the market share of bank i in that market is
lower than the average value of i’s market shares in the rest of the
markets
SUM SHARESikt Sum of the market shares (in terms of number of branches) of bank
k in year t of all the markets that are considered as target markets
for bank i
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Variables Definition
Id(SAVINGS BANKit ) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if entity i is a savings
bank (i.e., caja) and zero otherwise
Control variables
ln(TOTAL ASSETS)it Book value of the bank i’s assets at the end of the year t, in logs
ROAit Ratio of after-tax profit and the assets of bank i in year t
CAPITAL RATIOit Ratio of own funds over assets of entity i in year t, winsorized at
1%
Zit Z-score of the entity i in year t, winsorized at 1%, calculated as the
sum of the ROA and the CAPITAL RATIO of the entity divided
by the standard deviation of the ROA of the entity
PROVISIONS/LOANSit Ratio of the insolvency provision of entity i in year t to the total
loan portfolio
Id(VARit>VARkt) Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the variable “VAR”
of the acquiring entity i in year t is higher than the value of
“VAR” of the acquired entity k in year t, and zero otherwise
Macrovariables
INFLATIONt Inflation rate in year t
EURIBORt Average 12-month Euribor in year t
GDP GROWTHt GDP growth rate in year t
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